SME development programs: a critical review / Charles Harvie and Boon-Chye Lee by unknown
S 'M^y-i&y P u s a t Penerbitan Universiti (UPENA) 
UNIVERSITI 
TEKNOLOGI 
MARA 
fSSE 
CJ 
$%\ 
L £ ^ 
Journal of 
International Business and 
Entrepreneurship 
Volume 11 No. 1 January 2005 ISSN 0128-7494 
SME Development Programs: 
A Critical Review 
Charles Harvie 
Boon-Chye Lee 
Macroeconomic Stabilization Programs and 
Financial Performance of Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises in Turkey 
Alovsat Muslumov 
Guler Aras 
Cenktan Ozyildirim 
Structure, Employment and Productivity Growth: 
Evidence from the Unorganised Manufacturing 
Sector in India, 1984/5-1994/5 
Rajesh Raj S N 
Malathy Duraisamy 
Analyzing Cultural and Work Related Values 
in Thailand 
Jennifer Ann Swanson 
Kellyann Berube Kowalski 
Matthew H. Roy 
Instrumental and Noninstrumental Procedural 
Justice: Differential Effects on Organizational 
Citizenship Behavior 
Aizzat Mohd. Nasurdin 
T. Ramayah 
Saudi Consumers' Perceptions of Foreign Products M. Sadiq Sohail 
INFOREC/UPE NA 
EDITORIAL BOARD 
CHIEF EDITOR: 
Zuriah Abdul Rahman 
EDITORS: 
Tan Liam Seng 
Sarminah Samad 
Fauziah Noordin 
Rosmimah Mohd. Roslin 
Noormala Amir Ishak 
ADVISORY BOARD 
MEMBERS 
M.SadiqSohail 
King Fahd University of Petroleum and 
Minerals, Saudi Arabia 
Daing Nasir Ibrahim 
Universiti Sains Malaysia 
Adnan Shquier 
Bethlehem University, Palestine 
Osman Mohamad 
Universiti Sains Malaysia 
Subhash C. Jain 
University of Connecticut, USA 
David Bennett 
Aston University, UK 
Tony Proctor 
Chester Business School, UK 
AdamElhiraika 
United Economic Commission for Africa 
Dieter Ernst 
East West Center, Honolulu 
Ali Sanayei 
University of Isfahan, Iran 
© Journal of International Business and Entrepreneurship is jointly published by the 
Faculty of Business Management (FBM) and Pusat Penerbitan Universiti (UPENA), 
Universiti Teknologi MARA, 40450 Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia. 
The views, opinions and technical recommendations expressed by the contributors and 
authors are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Faculty or 
the University. 
REVIEWERS FOR THIS 
ISSUE 
Adnan Alias 
Universiti Industri Selangor, Malaysia 
Fauziah Noordin 
Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia 
Khulida Kirana Yahya 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
Khalifah Othman 
Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia 
Ismail Wahab 
Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia 
June M. L. Poon 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia 
Saadiah Mohamad 
Universiti Teknologi MARA 
Osman Mohamed 
Universiti Sains Malaysia 
Za'faran Hassan 
Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia 
Noraini Ismail 
Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia 
Roshidah Musa 
Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia 
Vinyu Veerayangkar 
Phuket Rajabhat University, Thailand 
Noormala Amir Ishak 
Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia 
Zuriah Abdul Rahman 
Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia 
Journal of 
International Business and 
Entrepreneurship 
Volume 11 No. 1 January 2005 ISSN 0128-7494 
1. SME Development Programs: A Critical Review 1 
Charles Harvie 
Boon-Chye Lee 
2. Macroeconomic Stabilization Programs and Financial Performance 
of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in Turkey 19 
Alovsat Muslumov 
Guler Aras 
Cenktan Ozyildirim 
3. Structure, Employment and Productivity Growth: 
Evidence from the Unorganised Manufacturing 41 
Sector in India, 1984/5-1994/5 
Rajesh Raj S N 
Malathy Duraisamy 
4. Analyzing Cultural and Work Related Values in Thailand 63 
Jennifer Ann Swanson 
Kellyann Berube Kowalski 
Matthew H. Roy 
5. Instrumental and Noninstrumental Procedural Justice: 
Differential Effects on Organizational Citizenship Behavior 79 
Aizzat Mohd. Nasurdin 
T. Ramayah 
6. Saudi Consumers' Perceptions of Foreign Products 93 
M. Sadiq Sohail 
SME Development Programs: 
A Critical Review 
Charles Harvie 
Boon-Chye Lee 
This paper reviews and examines the arguments for government intervention 
in markets with the purpose of providing assistance to SMEs in a range of 
activities. This review suggests that many of the arguments put forward for 
subsidising SME activities (as distinct from some activities of firms regardless 
of size) are not economically justified. Nonetheless, it is widely acknowledged 
that SMEs suffer from disadvantage relative to large firms, principally in the 
areas of access to finance, information and technology. Innovative measures 
aimed at alleviating such disadvantages require particular attention by 
government. 
Introduction 
Policies to promote the development of SMEs are common in both developed 
and developing countries (Storey, 1994; Levitsky, 1996; Hallberg, 2000). In the 
case of developed countries, it has become common place for governments 
during the last two or three decades to implement policies or programs designed 
to promote aspects of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This has 
coincided with an increase in the importance, in terms of contribution to 
employment and GDP growth, of SMEs in most of the developed economies 
(Storey, 1994). In the OECD countries, SMEs currently account for more than 95 
percent of firms and 60-70 percent of employment (OECD, 2000). This is in part 
the result of an ongoing process of industrial restructuring that began in the late 
1970s which saw large firms substantially reduce their output and labour, creating 
large pools of unemployed workers, a proportion of whom were motivated to 
start their own businesses (Storey, 1982). That process was given added impetus 
with the move towards privatisation and market deregulation in the late 1980s 
and 1990s, resulting in broad organisational trends that have included 
outsourcing and downsizing (Parker, 2000). Developments in information and 
communications technology, rising affluence and the development of niche 
markets, as well as the declining importance of economies of scale as the key 
source of competitiveness, have also contributed to the growth of the SME 
sector in developed economies. 
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In the case of developing economies, policies designed to assist SMEs 
have been an important aspect of industrial policy and multilateral aid programs 
such as those of the United Nations since the 1950s (Levitsky, 1996). Micro and 
small businesses are also playing an important social role, such as in the alleviation 
of poverty and empowering certain groups including that of women. Moreover, 
the movement by some formerly centrally planned developing economies (such 
as Vietnam and China) and highly regulated economies such as India towards 
deregulated and market oriented economies, with the emphasis on developing a 
vibrant private sector oriented economy, have given further impetus to the 
development of small businesses in many developing economies. However, 
while there are wide variations across countries the traditional picture is one 
where the relative importance of SMEs tends to decline as a country moves up 
the developmental ladder (see for example Hallberg, (2000 and Liedholm and 
Meade, 1999). The process of globalisation, characterised by increasing trade 
and capital flows, market opening and liberalisation and knowledge flows, has 
resulted in global sourcing and marketing for large enterprises. Outsourcing and 
the increasing involvement of small businesses in the supply chains of large 
transnational corporations has presented them with many business opportunities. 
Hence the traditional decline in the role and importance of SMEs in developing 
countries may likely change in the future. 
As the available data for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
economies indicate, SMEs account for a significant proportion of the labour 
force in both developed and developing economies (see Table 1). In addition, 
they also comprise a significant proportion of the business enterprises (see 
Table 2). It may therefore be argued that, purely from the viewpoint of their 
significance in their economies, SMEs warrant attention from governments. Storey 
(1994) has argued, in the UK context, that the increased importance of SMEs 
means that public policies towards them cannot be considered in isolation from 
other influences in the economy and cannot be left to those with a particular 
interest in SMEs. The significance of SMEs in their economies makes it important 
for policymakers to ensure that these enterprises do not face impediments that 
hamper their ability to operate efficiently and do not face onerous administrative 
compliance costs. We should be careful, however, not to conclude from this that 
it necessarily follows that policies specifically favouring SMEs over larger firms 
should be implemented. As Lattimore et al. (1998) note, "while economic 
importance provides a strong basis for public policy consultation with small 
business, in itself it provides little justification for specific interventions." 
Many policies relating to SMEs are based on the perceived weaknesses or 
disadvantages that they suffer relative to large firms. Studies of the problems 
faced by SMEs have concluded that they suffer from similar weaknesses in 
developing countries as they do in developed countries (Levitsky, 1996). However, 
a problem with government policies with respect to SMEs is that they have 
tended to be characterised by a lack of coherence, as Storey (1994) observed in 
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Table 1: Contribution of Micro, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises to Private 
Non-Agricultural Employment, Selected APEC Countries (%) 
Australia 
Hong Kong, China 
Japan 
Korea 
Mexico 
New Zealand 
Peru 
Philippines 
Singapore 
USA 
Micro 
(<5 
employees) 
25.9 
31.1 
13.1 
31.2 
36.2 
23.0 
62.5 
36.7 
7.1 
5.2 
Small 
(5-19 
employees) 
20.9 
13.0 
29.9 
11.3 
13.9 
18.0 
16.6 
25.8 
16.8 
13.6 
Medium 
(20-99 
employees) 
19.2 
24.8 
26.9 
36.2 
15.2 
19.0 
8.8 
7.1 
19.2 
17.9 
All SMEs 
66.0 
59.4 
69.9 
78.7 
65.2 
60.0 
87.9 
69.5 
43.1 
36.7 
Source: Hall (2002)1 
Table 2: Number of Private Non-Agricultural SMEs as a Percentage of Firms, 
Selected APEC Countries (%) 
Australia 
Chile 
Hong Kong, China 
Japan 
Korea 
Mexico 
New Zealand 
Peru 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
USA 
Micro 
« 5 
employees) 
69.9 
82.1 
86.8 
56.5 
72.7 
91.7 
84.2 
96.5 
91.1 
67.4 
79.0 
60.5 
Small 
(5-19 
employees) 
24.3 
15.0 
7.6 
34.7 
17.8 
6.3 
7.1 
3.1 
S.2 
24.3 
18.4 
28.9 
Medium 
(20-99 
employees) 
4.9 
2.1 
4.9 
7.4 
8.6 
1.6 
8.0 
0.3 
0.4 
6.1 
2.0 
8.9 
All SMEs 
99.0 
99.1 
99.3 
98.7 
99.1 
99.6 
99.4 
99.9 
99.6 
97.8 
99.4 
98.3 
Source: Hall (2002)2 
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the context of European countries, where "public policies have been developed, 
jettisoned, and often reintroduced on a piecemeal basis." Second, as Hallberg 
(2000: 1) noted, of developing country SMEs, they are: 
... a very heterogeneous group. They include a wide variety of firms -
village handicraft makers, small machine shops, restaurants, and computer 
software firms - that possess a wide range of sophistication and skills, and 
operate in very different markets and social environments. Their owners 
may or may not be poor. Some are dynamic, innovative and growth oriented; 
others are traditional 'lifestyle' enterprises that are satisfied to remain small. 
These observations are largely pertinent also to SMEs in developed 
countries and point to a key difficulty in policies designed to cater to such a 
diverse grouping of enterprises. However, recent trends, in both developed and 
developing countries, suggest that public policy is increasingly being focused 
more upon market oriented strategies and the establishment of a level playing 
field for all enterprises, rather than, as in the past, direct measures aimed at, for 
example, reducing the cost of credit. The microenterprise literature is particularly 
pertinent in explaining this change of emphasis3. 
In section 2 we offer a categorisation and critical appraisal of the various 
policies. As Storey (1994) has argued, 'The prime objective of macroeconomic 
policy is not solely to assist smaller firms, but rather to provide a framework for 
all sizes of enterprise in the economy to flourish." Thus, the test that a policy or 
program favouring SMEs must pass is that it not only must have a sound economic 
rationale but also, given the costs of design and implementation of such programs 
and the possibility of distortions to business incentives, demonstrate that it is 
capable of delivering net welfare benefits to society as a whole. We examine 
each policy argument from this viewpoint. Finally, we summarise our main 
conclusions in section 3. 
Categories of Government Support Policies for SMes 
Policies in support of SMEs may generally be categorised according to their 
objectives (see Table 3): broad macroeconomic objectives, such as the creation 
of jobs or the reduction of unemployment; social or equity objectives such as 
the redistribution of income; market failure or efficiency arguments, which relate 
essentially to considerations of static efficiency; and dynamic efficiency 
arguments, in particular the promotion of innovative activities. It is apparent 
that there are broad areas where these policies overlap with those in other areas 
of concern, in particular with competition policy. 
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Table 3: Categories of SME Support Policies 
Macro objectives 
Social objectives 
Correction of Market 
failure/inefficiency 
(static efficiency 
objectives) 
Dynamic efficiency 
objectives 
Creation of employment 
Economic development 
Export growth 
Income redistribution 
Poverty alleviation in developing countries 
Presence of externalities 
Market access barriers 
Asymmetric information 
Small number of competitors 
Information imperfection (lack of access 
to information about potential markets) 
Levelling the playing field 
Promotion of innovation 
Source: Authors 
Each of these categories of SME support policies is now discussed in turn. 
Macroeconomic Objectives 
The broadest objectives of SME policy are macroeconomic in nature. These 
include the creation of employment (or the reduction of unemployment) (although 
the first may not achieve the second if participation rates rise) and, in the case of 
developing countries, developmental objectives. As Levitsky (1996) noted in 
the case of donor aid programs targeting SMEs in developing countries, "all 
programmes were justified by arguing that small enterprises generated more 
employment for a given investment of scarce capital... Donors also looked to 
small enterprises as a way of dispersing economic development and of raising 
the standard of living of the rural sectors of the population." Employment creation 
is also a major objective of many SME policies in developed countries (de Koning 
etal., 1992; Revesz and Lattimore, 1997). 
Creation of Employment 
Because SMEs account for a significant proportion of employment in their 
economies, it is argued that selective policies aimed at creating employment in 
small business should be pursued. More recent analyses have pointed out flaws 
in the rationale for such an objective. Revesz and Lattimore (1997), for example, 
argue against adopting such an approach on several grounds. Although their 
arguments relate to the Australian case, they are largely applicable to other 
countries as well. 
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Revesz and Lattimore (1997) note that the argument that small firms are a 
major source of new jobs is based on inconclusive cross-sectional data, pointing 
out that no long-term longitudinal study of job creation has yet been undertaken. 
Further, even if it is true that small business has been responsible for more than 
a proportionate amount of net new jobs, it does not follow that policies to 
promote the SME sector are justified. First, they note that although the SME 
sector may be where many of the new jobs have been created, this does not 
mean that they are responsible for their creation and, indeed, they argue that 
many of the new jobs were created in this sector not because SMEs are better 
able to generate new jobs but because the products for which demand has 
increased are largely supplied by SMEs. That is, the recent trends in employment 
shares reflect changes in demand patterns in the economy (Lattimore et al., 1998) 
- and there is what Revesz and Lattimore (1997) term a "confusion of medium 
and cause". By implication, policies promoting SMEs will be misconceived if the 
pattern of demand shifts in the future. 
Second, Revesz and Lattimore (1997) argue that, given that the optimal size 
of the business unit is determined by technology and transaction costs,4 
government intervention may serve to distort the optimal distribution of firm 
sizes. Third, they argue that small firm survival rates are far lower than those for 
large firms, so that selective policies favouring small firm start-ups may increase 
turbulence, with attendant social and economic costs. Fourth, subsidies imply 
higher taxes, which may reduce incentives to work in addition to creating 
distortions in other sectors of the economy. Further, any subsidies to one sector 
of the economy at the expense of other sectors, or financed by additional taxes, 
should be justified on the basis that the net welfare benefits to society of such 
subsidies are positive (Storey, 1994; Belli, 1997). 
Fifth, Revesz and Lattimore (1997) point out the arbitrariness of the focus 
on job creation rather than job destruction - arguing that an equally arbitrary 
(and unsatisfactory) approach would be for an advocate of big business to 
argue for policies to stop job destruction on the basis that saving a job from 
being lost in a large firm is as valuable as creating one in a small firm; or for an 
advocate of a large public sector to argue against public sector rationalisation 
on the same grounds. 
Sixth, most small firms do not grow much or contribute significantly to net 
job creation. Job creation policies are therefore better targeted at those firms that 
do grow rapidly, but this would require unusual facility on the part of policymakers 
in picking winners. A program to create jobs in SMEs is therefore not likely to be 
very successful in achieving its objective (Lattimore et al., 1998). 
Seventh, even if it is true that SMEs have been responsible for most of the 
new jobs created in their economies in the recent past, a policy of assisting 
SMEs would not necessarily be the most effective way of creating new jobs. For 
example, a subsidy to SMEs to employ a previously unemployed person would 
not necessarily be more effective at eliciting a positive response from SMEs 
6 
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than it would from large firms along a range of dimensions such as the initial 
recruitment response, the duration of employment of any subsidised worker, the 
quality of the job and any associated training, and the extent to which participating 
firms would get a subsidy for a worker they would have hired anyway. 
Finally, Revesz and Lattimore (1997) argue that government assistance 
programs for "small" firms can be counterproductive if they reduce the incentive 
for growth of businesses that are about to exceed the threshold definition of a 
small firm. Levitsky (1996) reports evidence from India in the 1980s indicating 
that the government's policies of concessional assistance to SMEs was 
"constraining the growth of many enterprises that preferred to stay small rather 
than lose their privileged status" and indeed may have reduced the 
competitiveness of industry as a whole. 
Social Objectives 
Income redistribution 
Assistance to SMEs is sometimes justified by governments on the basis that the 
existing distribution of income is less than socially equitable. Aid agencies 
operating in developing countries have been drawn to provide assistance to 
small enterprises as a means of poverty alleviation and of improving the 
distribution of income (Levitsky, 1996). This is often tied in with other objectives 
such as creating employment, training, dispersing the benefits of development 
to rural areas and catering for rural markets through rural small enterprise 
programs, and promoting indigenous entrepreneurship. However, as Hallberg 
(2000) points out, "SME owners and workers are unlikely to be the poorest of the 
poor, so that SME promotion may not be the most effective poverty alleviation 
instrument." 
For developed countries, the income redistribution justification may be 
even less compelling. Storey (1982) has argued, in the UK context, that financial 
assistance to small firms would most benefit the relatively wealthy who are more 
able to start new businesses - citing evidence that although there were more 
"working class" entrepreneurs than "middle class" ones, small firms were much 
more likely to be started up by people from middle-class backgrounds than by 
those with working class backgrounds. 
In addition, there are more direct methods - such as income transfers - to 
achieve income redistribution objectives that are likely to be more effective than 
SME support policies (Hallberg, 2000). 
Market Failure or Inefficiency 
The conventional economic rationale for government intervention in markets 
based on market failure derives from the insight that competitive markets deliver 
7 
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optimal outcomes. According to the neoclassical economic paradigm, consumer 
welfare is maximised under conditions of perfect competition, and this outcome 
is Pareto-optimal, or ideal, in that no other outcome can achieve the same level of 
welfare for society as a whole (Van Cayseele and Van den Bergh, 2000). The 
conditions for markets to deliver Pareto-optimal outcomes are well known: many 
buyers and sellers in the market; a homogeneous product; perfect information 
regarding the availability of goods and services and the state of the technology; 
freedom of entry and exit by producers; and the absence of "spillover" or external 
effects. Under these stringent conditions, unencumbered markets represent the 
best way of organising the allocation of scarce resources. 
Failure of the market to deliver competitive outcomes results when any of 
these conditions is not met to a significant degree, and may therefore warrant 
government intervention. From this perspective, perfectly competitive markets 
may be regarded as an ideal that, while unattainable by and large, can be 
approximated by a judicious mix of market-oriented policies and government 
intervention. However, the presence of market failure does not in itself justify 
government intervention. A market failure argument for government policy in 
favour of SMEs must demonstrate not only that there is a failure of the market in 
some sense but also - since, in general, subsidies to one sector of the economy 
have to be provided at the expense of other sectors or by way of additional taxes 
raised for the purpose - that such a policy is capable of delivering net welfare 
benefits to society as a whole.5 
A related set of arguments pertains to competitive conditions that, for various 
reasons, may be a source of disadvantage to smaller firms relative to larger ones. 
We call attempts to remove these sources of disadvantage "levelling the playing 
field" so that SMEs can compete on a more equal footing with their larger 
counterparts. These are discussed below. 
Presence of externalities 
The presence of positive externalities or spillover effects from a particular activity 
is often taken as a justification for government involvement in that activity. 
Research and development activities, because they generate positive effects for 
external parties that are not fully appropriable by those undertaking the activities, 
fall into this category and government subsidies or direct grants are commonly 
employed to encourage them. From the viewpoint of SME policy, however, there 
is no particular reason why R&D that is undertaken by SMEs should be treated 
more favourably than if it is undertaken by large firms. The available research on 
the relative innovativeness of small versus large firms has been inconclusive 
despite extensive research into this issue since the 1950s.6 Other instances of 
externalities are discussed below. 
Subsidies for small firm startups is sometimes justified on the basis that 
they create more employment than comparable assistance to large firms (Storey, 
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1982). We examine this argument and discuss the issue of employment creation 
below. 
Number of competitors 
Competition is an area where SME policy overlaps with other policy concerns. 
Firm start-ups are sometimes encouraged on the basis that they result in net 
additions to the existing stock of firms in an industry, and this is therefore a good 
thing if the number of the existing firms is too "small" (market concentration is 
"high") so that there is an insufficient degree of competition in that industry. 
However, a policy aiming to achieve a particular size distribution of firms in any 
industry would be misconceived. As Hallberg (2000) points out, there is in fact 
no optimal or idealsize distribution of firms, but rather an "equilibrium" size 
distribution determined by "resource endowments, technology, markets, laws, 
and institutions."7 Indeed, some of the factors that determine the equilibrium 
size distribution of firms - technology-determined economies of scale, resource 
endowments, and consumption patterns - are in a sense "natural" determinants 
of firm size (Hallberg, 2000) that are arguably best left to the determination of 
market forces. 
Further, although a high market concentration has traditionally been regarded 
as conducive to the abuse of market power by firms, this is not necessarily the 
case: the opposite may be true, with more intense competition reducing profit 
margins and the number of firms that can survive in an industry (Symeonidis, 
2000). Symeonidis (2000: 22) argues that "[t]his means that concerns with the 
level of concentration need not take precedence over the need to ensure that 
competition remains effective, i.e., firms do not engage in collusive practices and 
no barriers to entry are created." 
Information imperfection 
A commonly cited disadvantage that SMEs are said to suffer is lack of information 
about potential or current markets, which hampers their ability to compete 
effectively and/or exploit potential market opportunities. Lattimore et al. (1998) 
cite evidence indicating that small firms experience greater difficulties than large 
ones establishing a distribution network in export markets and that they suffer 
more from lack of information. However, they argue that: 
... greater difficulty is not, by itself, a good basis for policy intervention. An 
economic rationale for assistance to small firms to commence exporting 
would require that there was some failure which led to firms not exporting 
when the benefits of exporting - either private benefits or the sum of private 
benefits and other benefits to the rest of the economy - were greater than 
its costs. (Lattimore et al., 1998: 76) 
9 
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Lattimore et al. (1998) list three types of externalities that may justify 
government intervention in the form of export assistance to SMEs. First, 
reputational externalities may exist in the form of a firm's marketing building up 
product reputations and market presence for other competitors from the same 
country as well as for itself- for example, Australian wines. Second, firms may 
learn a lot from leading-edge customers overseas and from the mere challenges 
of exporting, and there may be knowledge spillovers to other firms in the same 
country as the exporting firms. Third, firms entering new markets learn about 
how to sell in those markets and there may again be knowledge spillovers. The 
presence of spillovers, or externalities, Lattimore et al. (1998) argue, would provide 
the most durable theoretical case for export subsidies. However, it is likely that 
the size of the spillovers is relatively small, which would imply that any assistance 
should be correspondingly small. 
Levelling the playing field 
SMEs operate at a disadvantage relative to larger firms in a number of areas. 
Lack of access to finance and to technology are commonly cited as key areas of 
disadvantage suffered by smaller firms and constitute significant hurdles faced 
by SMEs. 
Disadvantage resulting from government policies 
In some cases the disadvantage may be the result of government policies that 
generate fixed costs that create a competitive disadvantage for smaller firms, or 
otherwise tilt the playing field against them. In particular, the cost of regulatory 
compliance may be more onerous for small firms than for larger ones. Smaller 
businesses may experience greater difficulties for a number of reasons (Lattimore 
et al., 1998). First, if there are fixed costs in compliance, such as learning about 
the regulations and putting in place systems to ensure compliance, these costs 
are likely to represent a higher proportion of turnover for SMEs than for large 
firms. Second, smaller firms are less likely to have the resources to employ staff 
to deal with regulatory matters, forcing a larger proportion of managers' time to 
be devoted to these issues and diverting attention away from the job of running 
the business. Lattimore et al. (1998) cite Australian evidence indicating that, in 
1994-95, although SMEs' share of economic activity was around one third, they 
bore around 85 percent of the total paperwork compliance burden. 
Recognition of the relatively higher burden on SMEs with regard to 
compliance costs has turned much recent policy attention to the question of 
regulatory reform. Many aspects of this - including the elimination of unnecessary 
regulations, more simple compliance, easier access to information about regulatory 
requirements and the elimination of inconsistencies in regulations between 
different jurisdictions and/or agencies - are relevant to firms of all sizes (Lattimore 
et al., 1998). These reforms are desirable from the viewpoint of removing regulatory 
hurdles to the efficient operation of all businesses regardless of their size. 
10 
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Other government policies may have the effect, albeit unintended, of 
discriminating against smaller firms. These include the following (see Hallberg, 
2000): 
• Official and unofficial levies that discourage small firms from growing and 
becoming formal 
• Tax structures that distort incentives and discriminate against small firms 
• Government procurement procedures that discourage successful bidding 
by small firms 
• Zoning regulations that restrict SME operations and entry into high-income 
markets 
• Labour market rigidities that make hiring and firing workers difficult and 
expensive, and limit the flexibility and mobility of the labour force 
However, it is not always clear that policies - e.g., labour market regulations 
such as redundancy payments or provisions against unfair dismissals - which 
are claimed to disadvantage smaller firms proportionately more than larger ones 
should be removed for the former in what is sometimes known as "regulatory 
tiering". This is the term used to describe the practice of applying more lenient 
regulations to small businesses or exempting them altogether from regulations 
judged to be overly burdensome to them (Lattimore et al., 1998). While 
governments are aware of the impact that regulatory tiering can have on the 
small business vote, they also need to take into account the interests of the 
wider community, the employment conditions of employees generally, and the 
impact on overall economic efficiency. As Storey (1994: 267) has expressed it, 
"the entrepreneur's 'red tape' is often the same as a worker's 'right' or a 
neighbour's 'environment'." 
Bickerdyke and Lattimore (1997: 55-56) make the same point: 
What [regulatory tiering] does is lower standards in order to lower the costs 
of compliance for owner-managers. And it is other people (workers and 
consumers in the broader community) who bear the costs of such lower 
standards. So any attempts to alleviate the apparently unfair burden on 
small business owner-managers occasions other re-distributions, which 
may also be regarded as unfair. 
Achieving an appropriate balance between the overall interests and welfare 
of the community and those of the SME sector is likely to remain a difficult task. 
Lack of access to finance 
Lack of access to finance has been one of the more pervasive problems faced by 
SMEs in both developed and developing countries. It represents a major constraint 
which can significantly affect the ability of a firm to grow, upgrade its technology, 
expand its markets, improve its management capabilities, raise productivity, or 
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simply to survive (Levitsky, 1996). Lack of access to finance by SMEs is generally 
attributed to capital market imperfections which have resulted in financial 
institutions being less skilled at servicing the financial needs of SMEs and the 
lack of nonbank capital markets that SMEs can tap into (Hawtrey, 1996). 
With respect to the difficulties that SMEs encounter in gaining access to 
debt financing, a recent conference of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council 
(PECC) concluded that the reasons typically relate to: 
"... firm size, risk, knowledge, and flexibility. SME borrowing requirements 
are small and frequently do not appeal to financial institutions. More collateral 
may be required than SMEs can pledge. Financial institutions may lack 
expertise in understanding small and medium knowledge-based business. 
The flexibility in terms and conditions of financing that SMEs require may 
not be available." (PECC, 2003) 
In addition, banks generally have difficulty assessing loans to SMEs because 
of the lack of accurate and reliable information on their financial condition and 
performance, unconvincing and weak business plans, all of which imply higher 
transaction costs in the processing of such loans. As a result, SMEs generally 
find themselves faced with higher interest rates for any loans they are able to 
secure, as well as more stringent requirements for collateral (Lattimore et al., 
1998). 
The alternatives to debt financing involve equity capital but here the 
problems are even more pronounced, particularly for SMEs in developing 
countries which tend to be undercapitalised. Equity capital would allow firms to 
spread and share the risk of high growth strategies by sharing equity ownership, 
but attempts to develop capital markets geared to small firms have not proved 
successful (PECC, 2003). The high fixed costs involved in stock exchange listing 
and the ongoing requirements for continuing disclosure act as a disincentive to 
SMEs. In turn, the higher risk profiles of these firms and the limited information 
they can provide means that they do not represent very attractive propositions 
to the broking community (PECC, 2003). 
Hall (2000) reports evidence for some APEC economies suggesting that the 
proportion of bank loans to SMEs has declined in the last decade: from 39 
percent in 1994 to 19 percent in 2000 in Australia; from 40 percent in 1992 to 27 
percent in 1999 in Chinese Taipei; and a less pronounced but similar downward 
trend in Canada, Indonesia, Japan and Korea. The only exception to this pattern 
for APEC countries, for which comparable data were available, is the US. While 
the reasons for the decline (in both relative and absolute terms) in funds available 
to SMEs are unclear, Hall (2000) postulates three possible explanations: (1) some 
statistical anomaly such as bracket creep as borrowers seek larger loans to 
offset the effects of inflation; (2) other more attractive sources of finance such 
as venture capital becoming available to SMEs; and (3) banks tightened their 
lending to SMEs, either as a result of regulatory changes (e.g., BIS requirements) 
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or because of the banks' perception of SME loans as less attractive. Hall concludes 
that the third explanation is the most likely. If correct, this may have long-term 
consequences for the number of new firm start-ups and for SME growth. 
Hall's (2002) study also reports an apparent trend in the APEC economies 
towards policies that positively discriminate in favour of smaller firms gaining 
better access to finance (see Table 4). Between the periods 1994/1996 and 2000/ 
2001, for example, the proportion of APEC economies that provided 
discriminatory tax rates favouring SMEs increased from 18 percent to 60 percent, 
while the proportion of countries with programs to provide financial support for 
start-ups increased from 6 percent to 60 percent. 
Table 4: Finance Policies in Support of SMEs in APEC Countries 
(% of APEC Countries) 
Policy 1994/95 2000/01 
Government underwriting of credit guarantee for 
SMEs in domestic operations 47 45 
Government support for SMEs engaged 
in exports 
Venture capital support 
General finance support (e.g., subsidised or 
regulated interest rates) 
Support program to provide micro finance 
for start-ups 
Concessionary tax rates or favourable tax 
treatments for SMEs 
Source: Adapted from Hall (2002, Table 7.3.1) 
In contrast to the observed trends in recent years that appear to favour 
policies actively favouring SMEs through policies such as subsidised loans and 
exports assistance, subsidies for start-ups and concessionary tax rates, Hawtrey 
(1997) argues for more market-oriented policies that aim for greater diversity and 
depth in the capital markets for the small business sector. He notes a number of 
developments arising from increased competition which indicate that the problems 
faced by SMEs in Australia are being alleviated. The developments include an 
increase in the availability of finance for SMEs, a decrease in interest margins, an 
increase in willingness to lend on the basis of cash flow, and innovations in loan 
schemes tailored to the requirements of SMEs. He suggests that policies should 
have three main objectives: (1) genuine competition between the various strata 
of the financial sector, from banks to non-bank financial intermediaries to foreign 
banks; (2) the removal of artificial disadvantages to SME financing such as the 
lack of advocacy (i.e., expanding the powers of the Banking Ombudsman to 
53 
41 
65 
6 
18 
70 
70 
50 
60 
60 
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allow representation for not just individuals but also small businesses) and the 
absence of national codes of behaviour for the extension of credit; and (3) 
actively nurturing the growth of open (particularly equity) capital markets for 
SME financial products. 
Likewise, PECC (2003) recommends the promotion of a flexible environment 
for a venture capital market specific to SMEs. And, drawing on the very successful 
experience of Bank Rakyat Indonesia in developing its own approach to the 
provision of uniquely tailored lending programs to SMEs, it also recommends 
that financial institutions be encouraged to tailor credit to SMEs and greater 
emphasis placed on training programs to help bank staff better understand the 
special requirements of SMEs. 
Lack of access to technology 
It is generally accepted that smaller firms are disadvantaged relative to large 
firms in terms of access to technology. Access to technology and making 
improvements to current technology are not ends in themselves, but a means to 
achieving dynamic efficiency and innovativeness. This issue is discussed in the 
following subsection. 
Dynamic Efficiency and the Promotion of Innovation 
The market failure rationale for government intervention in markets discussed 
above is based on the notion of departures from static efficiency. In the kind of 
world envisaged by static efficiency arguments, the implicit assumption is that 
the technology of production is stable and that companies will compete on the 
basis of price and quality. However, a relatively recent occurrence has been the 
increasing focus on the importance of dynamic efficiency as an objective of 
policy (American Bar Association, 2002; Clarke and Evenett, 2003). A survey of 
competition policy regimes by Industry Canada (1995) found that "around the 
world, competition policy is increasingly recognised as a vital element of the 
framework for a dynamic market economy." 
Dynamic efficiency is concerned with technological innovations enhancing 
welfare, and refers to "the use of resources so as to make timely changes to 
technology and products in response to changes in consumer tastes and 
productive opportunities" (Bureau of Industry Economics, 1996). As Audretsch 
et al. (2001) argue, "In a dynamic economy competition in product and process 
innovations may have a more significant effect on welfare, at least in the long 
run, than does any likely variation in price." UNCTAD (1998) is less equivocal, 
asserting that "[d]ynamic efficiency is probably the most important beneficial 
effect of competition." The conceptual underpinnings linking competition to 
dynamic efficiency or innovation are provided by Porter (1990), who argues that 
"healthy competition" is essential to delivering ongoing innovations in products, 
processes and methods, which in turn are critical to a country's prosperity. 
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The available research on the relative innovativeness of small versus large 
firms has been inconclusive despite extensive research into this issue since the 
1950s. Policies intended to encourage R&D activities in all firms regardless of 
their size, through grants and subsidies, therefore seem appropriate in this context. 
Indeed, the evidence would seem to suggest that it is technological opportunities, 
rather than firm size, that explain firm innovativeness (see, for example, Scherer, 
1970; Shrieves, 1978; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; and Geroski, 1990). However, it 
is generally accepted that smaller firms, because of their relatively low levels of 
employment of technical specialists, are disadvantaged relative to large firms in 
a number of areas, including establishing communication with external sources 
of scientific and technological expertise and knowledge. From the viewpoint of 
their management, there are opportunity costs in seeking out appropriate external 
sources of technical and other advice (Rothwell, 1991). 
Conclusions 
The review in this paper suggests that many of the arguments put forward for 
subsidising SME activities (as distinct from some activities of firms regardless 
of size) are not economically justified. As Hallberg (2000) argued, SME assistance 
programs are often motivated more by social or political considerations than by 
economic ones. Nonetheless, it is widely acknowledged that SMEs suffer from 
disadvantage relative to large firms, principally in the areas of access to 
information and technology. Careful formulation of policy is therefore necessary 
to ensure that any SME assistance programs deemed appropriate do not conflict 
with other areas of public policy. 
Notes 
1
 Hall (2002) reports the "latest available data" as at the time of his study. 
2
 Hall (2002) reports the "latest available data" as at the time of his study. 
3
 See, for example, Harvie (2004). 
4
 See the discussion under "number of competitors" below. 
See Belli (1997) for a good discussion of the role of government in relation to 
the market. 
6
 See Rothwell (1991, Table 4) for a summary of the advantages and 
disadvantages of small versus large firms in innovation. 
7
 See also Gans and Quiggin (2003). 
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